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1. Introduction and Policy Context 
Designing a carbon pricing mechanism which drives industrial decarbonisation 
while also safeguarding international competitiveness presents a major dilemma for 
policymakers. While an increasing share of global industrial emissions is covered by 
carbon pricing, coverage is likely to remain uneven at least in the short term. As a 
result, a country’s (or region’s) carbon price can undermine the international 
competitiveness of its trade-exposed sectors. This gives rise to the risk of ‘carbon 
leakage’—where production or investment is offshored to jurisdictions without a 
carbon price in order to avoid carbon costs. Carbon leakage can lead to a net increase 
in global emissions if facilities abroad are more emissions-intensive than domestic 
ones. As a result, the economic, environmental, and political consequences of leakage 
risk make it one of the most contentious issues when designing a carbon pricing 
instrument. 
Currently, the EU and other jurisdictions provide emissions allowances for free to 
sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage, but this strategy may become incompatible 
with ‘net zero’ objectives. Under an emissions trading system, free allocation of 
allowances (emissions permits) to emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) sectors 
such as cement, chemicals and steel can mitigate the cost increases incurred by 
domestic producers due to carbon pricing. It can thereby offset the potential loss of 
competitiveness relative to less regulated international competitors and thus reduce 
the risk of carbon leakage. Yet this approach has also faced criticism for muting the 
carbon price signal and conflicting with the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Moreover, an 
increasing push for countries to target ‘net zero’ emissions limits their ability to 
indefinitely provide free allocation. Ultimately, industrial decarbonisation is central 
to meeting the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and continued free allocation 
at current levels looks to be incompatible with a net zero future.  
Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA) could play a central role in resolving this 
dilemma because they maintain abatement incentives while also safeguarding 
industrial competitiveness. The apparent challenges around the future of free 
allocation have led to increased interest in instituting a BCA as an alternative policy 
to safeguard industrial competitiveness. In its most likely form, a BCA would impose 
a carbon ‘top-up fee’ on imports at the border. In principle, this would be levied 
according to the quantity of carbon emissions associated with the imported product 
and the shortfall in carbon pricing coverage of those emissions. This BCA on imports 
would thus reduce leakage risk by ensuring that domestic producers do not face an 
asymmetric carbon price in their home market. The introduction of such a BCA could 
facilitate the removal of free allocation and restore the full carbon price signal for 
domestic producers. 
In the EU, there is increasing political momentum for a shift to BCAs as a mechanism 
to support industrial decarbonisation while also incentivising stronger climate action 
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among its trade partners. A significant shift in Europe occurred in July 2019 when 
then incoming European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested 
that BCAs would be central to plans for a European Green Deal. BCAs could prove 
to be a key element of the EU strategy to drive greater emissions reductions 
domestically while incentivising action in laggard jurisdictions.5 On 4th March 2020, 
the European Commission opened consultations for the BCA roadmap. The EU is 
considering several design options for a BCA, including a carbon tax on selected 
products (both on imports and domestic production), a new carbon customs duty or 
tax on imports, or the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to 
imports. These options have in common that they only apply to imports, not to 
exports by EU producers. While a BCA for exports is not categorically excluded, it is 
less likely to be legally consistent with WTO rules.6 
This paper argues that a transition to BCAs does not resolve the competitiveness 
dilemma or make redundant the provision of free allocation, and sets out relevant 
economic and legal considerations. It will be critical for EU policymakers to fully 
understand the implications of a move from free allocation to BCAs—and to get the 
policy design right. A key economic point is that a BCA on imports raises the overall 
production cost of non-EU companies on their sales to the EU but has no impact on 
relative costs of EU and non-EU companies in external markets. This asymmetry in 
BCA design weakens its ability to address competitiveness concerns. By contrast, free 
allocation acts as a subsidy to the production of EU companies; this mitigates the cost 
increase they experience due to carbon pricing both for domestic sales in the EU 
market and for exports to non-EU countries. In short, free allocation can reach 
channels of competitiveness that BCAs cannot. Therefore, to maintain a balanced 
approach to safeguarding industrial competitiveness under a net zero mitigation 
trajectory, the introduction of an imports-only BCA does not necessarily make the 
provision of free allocation redundant. More broadly, policymakers need to navigate 
the trade-off that BCAs lead to a stronger carbon price signal for both domestic and 
external producers and raise additional government revenue, while free allocation 
offers more holistic competitiveness support. 
Related literature. This paper relates to three main strands of literature: (1) on 
competitiveness and leakage impacts of carbon pricing, (2) on the economics of 
border carbon adjustments, and (3) on the international law of border carbon 
adjustments. First, this paper sits within the context of literature on the 
competitiveness impacts of carbon pricing and concerns about carbon leakage. Early 
work by Reinaud (2005) focused on understanding the magnitude of production cost 
increases incurred by EITE sectors in the EU ETS, in light of the extent of 
(grandfathered) free allocation. All else equal, a greater increase in production costs 
                                               
5 France had previously already proposed to introduce a BCA as part of a “fair ecological transition”. Outside 
Europe, BCAs have precedent at a sub-national level in California’s carbon trading system. 
6 For further details, see below, Section 4. 
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leads to a greater concern about potential for production and employment losses and 
for carbon leakage—whereby emissions are offshored to outside the EU. Demailly & 
Quirion (2006) find that output-based allocation (OBA), that is linked to a firm’s 
current production levels, significantly enhances the ability of free allocation to 
mitigate carbon leakage. Over the last 15 years, numerous studies have sought to 
estimate (short-term) competitiveness and leakage impacts for individual sectors, 
notably cement and steel; Martin, Muûls & Wagner (2016) and Dechezleprêtre & Sato 
(2017) provide useful reviews of this empirical literature.7 Our contribution is a 
conceptual analysis that reflects recent EU policy developments, through the lens of a 
simple ABC framework that captures both short- and long-run competitiveness and 
different types of free allocation. 
Second, the design of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) and their rationale have 
been explored in a strand of the wider literature on carbon competitiveness. In a 
cross-model analysis, Böhringer, Balistreri & Rutherford (2012) find that a BCA on 
imports can significantly reduce carbon leakage to external jurisdictions. Fischer & 
Fox (2012) provide a detailed model-based economic comparison of different 
approaches to BCA implementation and find that a combined import- and export-
BCA is usually most effective at combatting carbon leakage. Hecht & Peters (2019) 
consider the impacts of BCA in an equilibrium model that, similar to us, uses the 
equalization of carbon costs between domestic and external firms as the metric by 
which BCAs can achieve “competition neutrality”. Cosbey, Droege, Fischer & 
Munnings (2019) provide a useful synthesis of the main findings from the BCA 
literature to date. More broadly, Helm, Hepburn & Ruta (2012) argue that the 
adoption of an import-BCA by one region can provide dynamic incentives for 
stronger carbon pricing in other regions (so as to capture the additional tax revenue). 
Our contribution in this paper is a stylized comparison of different BCA 
implementations, with an emphasis on limits to competitiveness protection given by 
import-only BCAs. 
Third, legal implications of BCAs, and notably their compatibility with international 
trade law, have been extensively studies in the literature, but with inconclusive 
results for BCAs on exports. Following earlier studies on the legality of border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) for environmental and energy taxes, Ismer & Neuhoff (2004) 
offer one of the earliest analyses of border adjustments and their legality as a tool of 
climate policy, concluding that a BCA for imports and exports would be admissible 
under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules provided it is calculated on the basis 
of a best available technology standard (Ismer & Neuhoff, 2004). De Cendra (2006) 
analyses the legality of border adjustments for exports, and concludes that the 
relevant WTO rules lack clear guidance on the question. A joint report by the WTO 
                                               
7 Neuhoff & Ritz (2019) synthesize the theory and evidence on the pass-through of carbon costs to product 
prices by industrial sectors in light of their market structure, international trade exposure, and the design of free 
allocation. 
 5 
and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) affirms that WTO rules 
permit the use of BTAs on exported products under certain conditions, but does not 
conclusively state whether allowances under an emissions trading system can be 
considered akin to an adjustable tax. Likewise, Hillman (2013)—a former member of 
the WTO Appellate Body—echoes the view that export BTAs can be legal, but does 
not extend her analysis to free allocation under an ETS. Holzer (2014) argues that 
exports would only be eligible for adjustment at the border if the costs accruing 
under an emissions trading system could be considered an indirect tax, something 
she considers unlikely. Mehling, van Asselt, Droege, Das & Verkuijl (2019) take a 
more favourable view on the classification of emissions trading as an indirect tax, but 
caution against overcompensation vis-à-vis domestically sold products. 
Overview of the paper. Section 2 introduces a simple ‘ABC framework’ through which 
to understand the drivers of industrial competitiveness under carbon pricing. It 
explains how free allocation and BCAs support these three channels in different 
ways. Section 3 provides an indicative economic analysis of the extent to which BCAs 
and free allocation are substitutes in terms of their competitiveness impacts. Section 4 
discusses legal considerations relevant for, respectively, the implementation of an EU 
BCA on exports and the combination of an EU BCA on imports with continued free 
allocation for exports. Section 5 concludes the analysis and suggests next steps for 
policymakers and industrial stakeholders. 
2. ABC Competitiveness Framework 
A simple framework helps to understand the three key channels of competitiveness 
impacts on EITE sectors under carbon pricing. In the short run, the competitiveness 
of domestic companies operating in EITE sectors can vary along two channels. 
Channel A reflects the competitiveness of their production in domestic markets 
relative to imports from rivals based in external jurisdictions. Channel B is their 
competitiveness in external markets to which they export. These short-run channels 
of competitiveness will importantly be driven by the short-run marginal cost of 
production of domestic producers relative to that of their rivals across both 
markets—which depend, in part, on the design of carbon prices. In addition, over the 
longer run, Channel C captures the competitiveness of existing productive capacity 
or new investment that may serve both domestic and external markets. This long-
term channel will, in general, also depend on the long-run marginal cost, which 
includes the cost of capital. All three channels matter for a holistic assessment of how 
different carbon pricing policy options can safeguard EITE competitiveness—and, 
closely related, mitigate the risk of carbon leakage. The immediate priority for policy 
is to focus on addressing Channels A and B, as this is what drives short-run 
behaviour and is likely to be a pre-condition for avoiding competitive distortions 
from Channel C over the longer run. Figure 1 illustrates the ABC competitiveness 
framework. 
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Free allocation can safeguard industrial competitiveness through all three channels, 
but the method of free allocation has important implications for which channels are 
reached. The free allocation of emissions allowances can assume several forms, with 
different implications for the competitiveness of domestic companies:  
1. Grandfathering: Grandfathered allowances that are based solely on historical 
emissions are equivalent to a lump-sum transfer that has no impact on the 
marginal cost of production. Such ‘pure’ grandfathering therefore does not 
address Channel A or B but can affect Channel C by forestalling closure of 
productive capacity.  
2. Output-based allocation: At the opposite end, output-based allocation (OBA) 
explicitly links the extent of free allocation to current production levels—
which, in principle, can address all three of the ABC channels of 
competitiveness impacts.  
3. Hybrid allocation: Current EU policy is a hybrid form of free allocation that 
combines elements of grandfathering and OBA with an emissions 
performance standard that caps allocations according to the best-performing 
companies in an EITE sector. Its fixed baseline period limits the degree to 
which allocations adjust with production levels.  
 
 
Figure 1: ABC framework of short- and long-run competitiveness channels 
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The central point is that common forms of free allocation, in practice, mitigate some 
combination of the short-run Channels A and B and long-run Channel C. While this 
helps domestic companies compete in both domestic and external markets, the 
correspondingly muted short-run carbon price blunts the incentive for industrial 
abatement. 
A BCA that is levied only on imports to avoid potential legal concerns therefore 
supports EITE competitiveness primarily along the short-run Channel A of the ABC 
framework. A BCA in the form of a border tax on imports serves as a top-up carbon 
fee on products sold to the domestic market by companies from external jurisdictions 
(with zero or at least lower carbon prices). In this way, the BCA on imports raises the 
marginal cost of export for these external companies; this, in turn, supports the 
competitiveness of domestic producers along Channel A of the framework. 
However, the BCA on imports has no effect on Channel B because it leaves 
unchanged the relative costs of domestic and external companies for sales to external 
jurisdictions. (This would be different under a BCA design that combines a tax on 
imports with a subsidy to exports.) Given this remaining asymmetry in short-term 
competitiveness along Channel B, it is unlikely that such a BCA on imports only will 
have a sufficiently strong effect on the longer-term competitiveness channel C. 
However, this BCA does maintain the strength of the domestic carbon price signal 
and therefore does not blunt abatement incentives in the way that common forms of 
free allocation do.  
3. Economic Analysis of Border Carbon Adjustments vs. Free 
Allocation 
We now use a simplified economic analysis to explain more formally the differences 
between free allocation and BCAs levied on imports in terms of the competitiveness 
support they provide. Our analysis aims to inform policy discussion by clarifying the 
different roles that different policy instruments can play to address EITE 
competitiveness. For simplicity and concreteness, we assume that the world is split 
into two regions: the European Union (EU) and the rest of the world (ROW). Carbon 
prices in these two regions are written as ti and tj, respectively, where the EU has a 
higher carbon price than that in effect in the ROW, with ti>tj. The ROW carbon price 
can be interpreted as an average across a larger number of non-EU countries. Our 
analysis takes the two regions’ carbon prices ti and tj as given and fixed, rather than 
these also being policy instruments. In the case of the EU ETS, for example, this 
simplifying assumption can be justified by the carbon price being significantly driven 
by electricity generation, which is generally not exposed to international 
competitiveness concerns in the way that the industrial sectors are. 
Free allocation dilutes the carbon price faced at the margin by domestic producers 
while a BCA tops up the carbon price faced by imports. The impact of free allocation 
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on the carbon price is captured by the parameters fi and fj, both on [0,1], where a 
value of zero means no dilution and a value of one represents full dilution. Output-
based allocation, by acting as an effective subsidy to production, dilutes the carbon 
price faced by industrial emitters at the margin. Current hybrid EU allowance policy 
corresponds to 0<fi<1—with elements of grandfathering, output-based allocation, 
and an emissions performance standard. The ‘effective’ carbon prices in the EU and 
ROW are therefore given by (1-fi)ti and (1-fj)tj. A BCA tops up the carbon price faced 
by imports; its analytics are detailed below.  
As a simple proxy for competitiveness concerns, we consider the EU’s policy 
objective to be a level playing field in effective carbon prices using free allocation 
and/or a BCA on imports.8 The equalization of effective carbon prices across the EU 
and the ROW serves as a simple proxy in our analysis for concerns about industrial 
competitiveness. This equalization of carbon prices also leads to an equalization of 
marginal abatement costs across jurisdiction, which is the basic cost-efficiency 
property of carbon pricing. (We argue further below that similar conclusions would 
obtain under alternative metrics for competitiveness.) The two policy instruments 
available to the EU are the extent of free allocation as well as the introduction of a 
BCA on imports. We assume a preference for using as little free allocation as possible 
to achieve the policy objective. In view of a likely BCA proposal by the EU, our main 
question is on the policy implications of a move from free allocation to an import-
only BCA as a means to address competitiveness. The impacts of policy options on 
competitiveness are considered in terms of the ABC framework presented above.  
Case 1: A local perspective on competitiveness  
First consider a local perspective on competition focused on domestic production by 
EU-based producers competing with imports from ROW companies. In the absence 
of a BCA, effective carbon prices for EU and ROW producers are (1-fi)ti and (1-fj)tj. 
These effective carbon prices are equalized if the degree of free allocation to EU-
based producers is equal to fi = [1-(1-fj)(tj/ti)] ≡ fi*. This serves as our benchmark 
against which to compare the effects of the introduction of a BCA. Observe that this 
‘optimal’ degree of free allocation is always positive, fi*>0, as a direct consequence of 
the EU having a higher carbon price than the ROW. A lower degree of free allocation 
is needed if either the ROW has a higher carbon price or itself provides less free 
allocation.  
In the case of a local perspective, both free allocation and a BCA on imports can level 
the playing field in terms of effective carbon prices. Now suppose that the EU 
                                               
8 This aligns with the likely focus of the EU’s proposed BCA: “Carbon leakage occurs when production is 
transferred from the EU to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction, or when EU products are 
replaced by more carbon-intensive imports... a carbon border adjustment mechanism would ensure that the price 
of imports reflect more accurately their carbon content.” See EU Inception Impact Analysis, 2020, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-
Mechanism 
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additionally introduces a BCA on imports. With the BCA, the effective carbon price 
that ROW producers face when selling into the EU becomes (1-fj)tj+bi[(1-fi)ti-(1-fj)tj], 
where the parameter bi, also on [0,1], measures the extent of the top up implied by 
the BCA. In effect, the BCA on imports is a top-up to the effective carbon price of 
non-EU producers—while it has no effect on the effective carbon price paid by EU 
companies themselves. By design, therefore, a ‘full’ BCA, with bi=1, by construction 
equalizes effective carbon prices—regardless of the degree of free allocation. 
Similarly, equalization again occurs always where free allocation is at the level fi = 
fi*—regardless of the existence or extent of the BCA. 
This local perspective suggests that the EU has two distinct main policy options to 
maintain industrial competitiveness. Either it can continue the use of free allocation 
at the level fi = fi* and not rely on a BCA at all. Or it can switch the policy design to a 
full BCA on imports, with bi=1, and discontinue free allocation, as it is then no longer 
needed. In other words, this local perspective on competitiveness suggests a strong 
element of policy substitution: optimal use of one policy instrument makes 
redundant the use of the other. This reasoning is in line with recent EU policy 
discussions that envision a BCA replacing free allocation. Indeed, the particular 
attraction of the imports-BCA here is that, unlike free allocation, it maintains the 
carbon price signal for abatement—and also raises additional government revenue 
for EU countries.  
The limitation of this local perspective, however, is that it does not take into account 
competition in non-EU export markets. There are at least two problems with this 
local perspective on competitiveness. First, while it ‘solves’ Channel A of the ABC 
competitiveness framework, it ignores Channel B: EU companies will still face 
asymmetric carbon prices in their export markets. Second, all else equal, it leaves 
open the possibility that long-run returns on investment will nonetheless be lower in 
the EU. With EU firms still facing an uneven playing field in ROW markets, this may 
impact decisions regarding current productive capacity or investment in new 
capacity—leading to Channel C-type leakage of productive capacity. If such 
competitiveness impacts are pronounced, this could lead to early closure of 
industrial plants, forestall upgrades to improve productivity or carbon efficiency, 
and see investment in new capacity in ROW that may otherwise have occurred in the 
EU.  
Case 2: A global perspective on competitiveness  
Now consider a fuller picture that captures global competitiveness, also in ROW 
markets. In addition to the previous single-market perspective, this now also 
includes the position of EU producers exporting to ROW markets. As a benchmark, 
with free allocation yet without a BCA, effective carbon prices are (1-fi)ti for EU 
producers in both EU and ROW markets, and (1-fj)tj for ROW producers also in both 
markets. So effective carbon prices are again equalized if the EU’s free allocation is 
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equal to fi = [1-(1-fj)(tj/ti)] ≡ fi*. Crucially, this degree of free allocation restores the 
level playing field across both EU and ROW markets. In this sense, the previous 
finding on free allocation is robust to a multi-market perspective.  
The global perspective reveals that free allocation can reach channels of 
competitiveness that a BCA cannot. The introduction of a BCA on imports by the EU 
again has no effect on the effective carbon price of EU producers, which remains (1-
fi)ti in both their domestic and export markets. For ROW producers, the key 
observation is that their effective carbon price in their domestic markets also remains 
unaffected at (1-fj)tj by the BCA on imports. Like before, their effective carbon price 
on exports to the EU becomes (1-fj)tj+bi[(1-fi)ti-(1-fj)tj]. This leads immediately to the 
conclusion that now a full BCA (bi=1) is unable to equalize effective carbon prices 
globally as it cannot ‘reach’ competition in ROW markets. Effective carbon prices are 
equalized for both producer types in both markets as long as (1-fi)ti=(1-fj)tj+bi[(1-fi)ti-
(1-fj)tj]=(1-fj)tj. It is easy to verify that this condition is, once again, satisfied by a free 
allocation fi = [1-(1-fj)(tj/ti)] ≡ fi*, regardless of the degree of BCA. As a result, moving 
to a BCA here comes with zero policy substitution: the same level of free allocation 
remains optimal for ‘global’ competitiveness. This shows that a BCA on imports 
(only) is necessarily insufficient to fully address all competitiveness channels 
underlying the ABC framework. 
A simple metric that captures the potential limitations of import-only BCAs as a 
competitiveness instrument is the export reliance of domestic producers. In the EU, a 
large proportion of products on the carbon-leakage list corresponds to major 
exporting industrial sectors. As an illustration, Figure 2 shows potential export 
exposure of the steel industry. This sector accounts for nearly €128 billion in gross 
value added (GVA) and supports nearly 2.5 million European workers directly and 
indirectly9. Around 15% of EU finished steel products are exported to ROW 
destinations. The top two EU export destinations for the sector are the US and 
Turkey. Each of these countries has a large steel production base and a relatively low 
likelihood of placing a price on industrial carbon emissions in the short term—given 
that neither has ratified the Paris Agreement. Failure to account for the export 
dynamics of such sectors when designing a BCA could present a risk of carbon 
leakage.  
Other competitiveness metrics such as market share or profitability are likely to yield 
a similar conclusion: a BCA on imports alone does not make free allocation 
redundant. The above analysis shows that free allocations and BCAs have limited 
substitutability using one of the simplest metrics of competitiveness: equalization of 
effective carbon prices. There are several other natural metrics of competitiveness 
such as EU companies’ market share, profitability, and production volumes. 
Quantifying the rate of policy substitution between free allocation and BCAs in these 
                                               
9 http://www.eurofer.org/News%26Events/PublicationsLinksList/201806-SteelFigures.pdf. 
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cases would require a model of the competitive dynamics at the sectoral level. 
However, we think that the basic conclusion would continue to apply in a less stark 
form: moving to an import-only BCA may well allow the level of free allocation to be 
reduced—but not all the way to zero. Absent some other form of export-BCA, both 
policy levers will be needed to fully address competitiveness concerns under the 
ABC competitiveness framework.  
 
Figure 2: Illustration of EU steel exposure to export market 
Source: Based on data from Eurofer (2018), European Steel in Figures; each flag 
represents 1% of the top 10 destinations, the EU steel industry 
 
Our formal analysis so far has deliberately focused very narrowly on 
competitiveness concerns; other economic and political factors may favour a BCA 
over free allocation. One important distinction between free allocation and a BCA 
concerns government revenue. Free allocation forgoes fiscal revenue from allowance 
auctions while a BCA raises additional fiscal revenue at the border. This is one aspect 
that, all else equal, favours a BCA over free allowances—especially if the latter relies 
on generous levels of allocation. Another important consideration is that a BCA 
transfers some of the EU’s abatement incentive to non-EU producers—and therefore 
may drive additional global emissions reductions. BCAs may also have a role in 
driving increased uptake of carbon pricing in ROW jurisdictions. Where the EU is an 
important destination market for ROW products, the EU’s BCA may create an 
incentive for the adoption of carbon pricing in the ROW—partly as a device to 
capture carbon revenues. Such an adoption dynamic for BCAs could, over time, 
reduce the need for free allocation and help create an international level playing field 
in carbon.  
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More broadly, therefore, our analysis suggests that policymakers need to navigate a 
complex trade-off between free allocation and BCAs, and this may be different 
depending on each sector’s economic characteristics. While free allocation can offer 
more holistic competitiveness support, BCAs can lead to a stronger carbon price 
signal for both domestic and external producers and raise additional government 
revenue. At the same time, the introduction of BCAs raises considerable 
administrative and legal challenges, while free allocation is already in place and 
enjoys relatively broad acceptance among ETS stakeholders. These trade-offs can 
resolve differently across EITE sectors depending on the extent of their export 
reliance and on the value of a stronger abatement incentive. Our analysis highlights 
the need for careful consideration of internal and external market dynamics, and 
potential policy interactions for the EU to develop a coherent policy mix.  
4. Legal Analysis of Border Carbon Adjustments vs. Free Allocation 
While a BCA can in principle also cover exports, doing so makes it more likely to 
incur legal challenges than an import-only BCA. While the EU’s plans to date suggest 
it is considering an import-only BCA, a BCA design can, in principle, also apply to 
exports; that is, it can adjust for climate-policy asymmetries at the border when 
domestic products leave the EU to be sold in external markets. Such adjustment 
could occur in the form of an exemption, regulatory relief, or compensation payment. 
For example, products destined for export markets may be exempt from the need to 
pay the carbon price on emissions associated with their production. In doing so, 
however, an export BCA incurs a two-fold risk of violating international trade law: 
1. Relief or exemption for exports would reduce the reach of the EU’s carbon 
price—which currently does cover emissions associated with production of 
exported goods. Because it reduces the degree to which carbon costs are 
internalized across the EU, such an export BCA is thus less likely to be 
considered a measure necessary to protect the environment or related to the 
conservation of exhaustible resources. That, in turn, would mean that an 
export BCA may not benefit from the exemption of Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because the export-BCA would not 
apply to goods from trade partners, however, it is unlikely to be considered 
discriminatory under GATT, and will instead raise concerns under WTO 
subsidy rules, as described in the next point. 
2. Any form of support specifically to products destined for export also increases 
the risk of a violation of multilateral disciplines under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Under that treaty, 
a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution by a government that confers a 
benefit. This broad definition includes foregone government revenue that 
would otherwise be due, as is the case when a government allocates 
allowances for free where auctioning has otherwise become the default, when 
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it compensates relevant costs, or when it altogether exempts exporters from 
compliance. Such relief will further be considered a prohibited subsidy if its 
award is made contingent on export performance, that is, if there is a 
relationship of conditionality or dependence between the award and 
exportation. Because an export BCA would be conditional on exportation, it 
could be, prima facie, classified as a prohibited subsidy. 
Combining free allocation with an import-only BCA may face legal challenges under 
multilateral free trade disciplines but such legal risks can be lowered if certain 
conditions are met. While continuing the practice of free allocation for exports only 
raises the legal risks identified in the previous paragraph, there are ways to combine 
an import BCA with free allocation – as suggested by our ABC competitiveness 
analysis – so as to limit these risks.  
First, an environmental argument can be made for retaining free allocation: ensuring 
the competitiveness of EU producers in international markets will help safeguard 
their market share against foreign products that may have a higher carbon intensity. 
The strength of this argument will vary across industries depending on the extent of 
competition and on the carbon intensity of EU producers relative to the average non-
EU competitor (as, in practice, an import BCA is likely to be based on default values 
for carbon intensity that are applied uniformly to non-EU imports). What is more, 
free allocation would not simply exempt exported products from the EU’s carbon 
price, but – akin to the current system of free allocation – would continue to provide 
a dynamic incentive for carbon-intensity reductions through the use of benchmarks.  
Second, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures also specifies that 
exemption or remission of indirect taxes for exports is admissible if it does not 
exceed those levied on like products sold for domestic consumption. Two conditions 
have to thus be met in order for this provision to sanction free allocation for exports: 
the application of the EU ETS to producers of goods destined for domestic 
consumption has to qualify as an indirect tax; and the value of freely allocated 
allowances must not exceed the carbon cost borne by domestically consumed goods.  
While there is support for considering an emissions trading system an indirect tax, 
the literature on this question is divided. Pending relevant case law, this first 
condition will remain subject to legal uncertainty. For the second condition,  the 
regulator will have to ensure that the allowances allocated for free to exporters does 
not exceed the amount they would otherwise have to purchase at auction if their 
goods were sold into the domestic market. As long as free allocation for emissions 
associated with exported products continues to be based on the current 
benchmarking system and is combined with full auctioning for emissions associated 
with products sold into the domestic market, this condition is likely to be met. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our economic analysis suggests that an import-only BCA does not necessarily make 
redundant the use of free allocation of allowances in providing competitiveness 
support to EITE sectors. An import-only BCA comes with an inherent asymmetry: it 
levels the competitive playing field in EU markets but cannot address competition in 
external markets. By contrast, free allocation can support cost competitiveness of EU 
producers across both EU and external markets. Therefore, a move to import-only 
BCAs does not necessarily make redundant the continued use of free allocation to 
help safeguard overall industrial competitiveness. Our analysis made this point 
using the equalization of effective carbon prices as a simple proxy for 
competitiveness concerns; we believe that a similar point also applies to richer 
metrics of competitiveness such as market share and profitability.  
Our legal analysis suggests that combining free allocation with an import-only BCA 
may face challenges, but also that such legal risks can be reduced if certain 
conditions are met. While a BCA for exports has not been categorically ruled out by 
the EU, it is less likely to be consistent with WTO rules and therefore less likely to be 
proposed than an import-only BCA. Combining free allocation for exported products 
with a BCA on imports can increase the risk of legal challenges under multilateral 
free trade disciplines. Still, if the design ensures that exporters retain an incentive to 
lower their carbon intensity and do not benefit from free allocation in excess of the 
carbon pricing burden faced for domestically sold products, this risk can be limited. 
Driving industrial decarbonisation while maintaining international competitiveness 
remains a major challenge for policymakers shaping the European Green Deal.  A 
complete picture of industrial competitiveness includes a short-term level playing 
field and avoiding longer-term competitive distortions to capacity utilisation and 
new investment. BCAs may prove an important new tool to address the risk of 
carbon leakage. Over the longer term, decarbonisation will be driven by innovation 
policy. While a rising carbon price enhances abatement incentives, it is insufficient to 
overcome non-price barriers to innovation and technology adoption. The capital-
intensive and integrated nature of industrial production processes means that 
policymakers will need to continue to support research, development and 
deployment of prospective low-carbon technologies. 
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